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Paper Wall: The Law as a Tool of Social Division for Courtroom Officials
Introduction
On August 11, 2014, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers Sharlton Wampler
and Antonio Villegas confronted and shot an African-American man named Ezell Ford multiple
times. Concerned about his being in a “gang area,” the officers stopped their car and began
speaking to Ford, who was walking on the sidewalk. After he “veered into a residential
driveway and slipped between a car and some bushes,” the officers found him “bent over, hands
obscured,” and were concerned “[he] was carrying drugs and trying to dump them. (Larrubia and
Keller: KPCC June 11, 2015). The officers decided they had enough evidence, given that he was
in an area prone to illegal drug use, to “cuff him,” and a struggle ensued that would eventually
kill the man. (Larrubia and Keller: KPCC June 11, 2015). No drugs were ever found in the area.
Although dealing with one branch of the justice system, Ford’s story is telling of the
biases that play a role in defining how interactions between legal officials and ordinary citizens
go, and what makes examinations of the legal system so relevant. They are significant
throughout the justice department – creating relationships with law enforcement while also
dictating proceedings in the courtroom. I viewed these trends, which create unequal divisions of
power, firsthand in conducting anthropological fieldwork at a courthouse in the mid-Atlantic
region of Silver County, over the course of four months. My ethnographic work consisted of
participant observation during public hearings or trials, and interviews of courtroom officials
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including the District Attorney, Chief Sheriff’s Deputy, and Chief Public Defender. Their names
here are pseudonyms. Importantly, I found that many of the people I met with and observed were
unable to acknowledge the biases that are implicit in the judicial system. The main question that
drives my research is why this discrepancy exists, and there is no easy answer for it. From my
experience, I would argue that it is a combination of officials’ livelihood being tied to their work,
and their commitment to a binary sense of right and wrong. In the eyes of the officials, the law
acts objectively, without input from individual people. They may contend that the law exists
separately because their income, to support their children or pay for their house, is based upon
the legal system surviving. For that reason, I hypothesize that they may be less inclined to
acknowledge its flaws.
My research focused on biases in five areas, which make up the subsections of this paper.
The first is power inside the courtroom, including the way that officials conduct themselves,
contrasted with the way that defendants must do so. There are both physical and symbolic
boundaries that drive these interactions. The second, power outside the courtroom, has to do with
the ways officers in law enforcement make judgments in their day-to-day work, and also how the
context of its location affects court attitudes. In the third section, I examine how race is tied to
the way that the judicial system runs. Specifically, using accounts from officials at the Silver
Country Courthouse, I discuss trends in the race of defendants, lawyers, judges, and juries.
Among the people that I interviewed, the Chief Public Defender, Allison Carmichael, pointed to
by far the most issues in this area in our meeting. This fact is also significant. Next, I analyze the
ways that gender differences become apparent with the way that positions are filled at the
courthouse. There are tendencies for men, for example, to occupy the positions of the most
power. Finally, I examine how language serves as an indicator of power within the court system.
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It is necessary to learn a whole new vocabulary of legal terms to participate in court hearings,
and the ability of some people to do so enables them to control what happens more easily.
Meanwhile, others must take a more passive role.
Context of the Place and the Players
These trends are especially relevant today. Although less known, Ford’s death is insight
into the breadth of people affected that occurs outside of the spotlight. Those events, coupled
with other similar ones around the same time led to what became known as the
“#BlackLivesMatter” movement, which focused on exposing some of the same phenomena that I
examined, with an emphasis on racial discrepancies. As co-founder Alicia Garza (2016:23) puts
it, “Black Lives Matter is an ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives
are systematically and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an affirmation of Black folks’
contributions to this society, [their] humanity, and [their] resistance in the face of deadly
oppression.” With its founding, the divisions between law enforcement and minority
communities became even more pronounced, turning into a national issue that rallied around the
deaths of other African-Americans such as Michael Brown and Trayvon Martin (Garza 2016:23).
This tension has made it intriguing to study, and is the backdrop upon which my research is set.
I drew these conclusions during 20 hours of fieldwork and 5 hours of interviews, over the
course of four months in late 2016 at the courthouse. Doing so presented several challenges.
First, it was difficult to plan my schedule around when there would be hearings going on, which
occurred largely in the morning. I did not know what to expect initially, and I was only able to
stay for around an hour at a time before I had class. The periods in which there were hearings
were also erratic. There were long periods in which there were no trials of any kind, as the
prosecution prepared a case against the defendants. Furthermore, I was not allowed to witness a
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few different kinds of proceedings, such as family and juvenile court, which limited my ability to
conduct thorough fieldwork. In addition, although I got to know some of the attendants who
worked in the courtroom, I was not able to participate directly in the hearings. Without a law
degree, I was powerless to play an active role in the proceedings I witnessed, and instead
watched from my assigned seat as the other actors did.
Towards the beginning of my fieldwork, I had difficulty with the differences in language
at the courtroom and in everyday life. During my first few weeks of fieldwork, each time I went
to the courthouse I returned with a list of vocabulary terms I had heard and did not understand. I
was largely ignored by the courtroom staff until my last few weeks of fieldwork, when several
lawyers asked me if I was waiting for my own trial. I sat in two kinds of courtrooms – criminal
and civil cases, and settlement cases. The criminal and civil cases took place in much larger
courtrooms on the fourth floor, with a judge, space for a large jury, press members, and space for
an audience around fifty people. In contrast, the settlement cases took place in a much smaller
room, located on the third floor of the courthouse, with only the judge and the lawyers in
attendance. Aside from me, there was no audience in these hearings.
Over time I began to note some of the patterns that governed the way that the courthouse
was run. From the security checkpoint immediately inside the doors, designed to filter who was
allowed in and where they were going, to the placement of sheriff’s deputies inside the
courtroom, to the location of the main courtrooms on the top floor, to the language used by
attorneys and judges, aspect of the proceedings was designed to instill power in the bureaucracy.
Gradually, I started to acknowledge these factors, that, intentionally or not, were playing a role in
both how defendants and how officials felt. I began to focus my research on the manifestations
of the same kind of bias that influenced the death of Ezell Ford. As his case shows, perceptions
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about people and the areas in which they live dictate police attitudes towards them. These police
attitudes are translated into the official view of the legal system if a case is brought to court. But
where do such attitudes come from? Are they based upon fact or rumors, or both? Does the legal
system acknowledge any differences between them? Are there demographics that lend
themselves to one role or the other? Why? And how does the legal system intersect with religion,
with culture, or with society, generally? Should they be separate? As Laura Gomez (2010:501)
writes, “racial ideology is an essential part of exploring how race and law co-construct each other
in ongoing ways. In the contemporary context, it would be useful for scholars to trace the rise of
color-blind ideology as having deep roots in law and yet increasingly embraced in society at
large.”
My focus was not limited to racial discrepancies, however. I found that there were
important manifestations of gender bias and racial bias, and resolved to study those, and any
other biases that I found prevalent. The list turned out to be more extensive than I had
anticipated. I initially believed that the courthouse operated in an impartial manner, but with time
saw my views changed. Although at first I found the experiences of the defendants themselves
more interesting, I shifted focus when I realized the difficulty that communicating with them
would be. Officials, on the other hand, would be much easier to get in touch with, and could
allow me to conduct more in depth fieldwork. Whereas defendants filtered in and out of the
courthouse frequently, the officials stayed. For that reason, I believed that I would have access to
a wealth of knowledge that my informants could tell me, and a topic that defined the courthouse
as a space.
These areas, which made clear to me that proceedings were not as objective as officials
would have liked, were wide ranging. Over the course of my fieldwork I noticed that there were
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important distinctions between the amount of men and women who were involved in
proceedings at the courthouse. The number of men forced to appear in court, for example, far
outnumbered the number of women, while every judge was male. In addition, Silver County is
not immune to the same racial issues that made Ezell Ford’s death contentious, and I found there
were implications about the types of people that exercised power in the courtroom and the people
who were subject to it. Bourdieu (1987:837) writes that a trial “represents a paradigmatic staging
of the symbolic struggle inherent in the social world: a struggle in which differing, indeed
antagonistic world-views confront each other. Each, with its own individual authority, seeks
general recognition.” But these authorities are not equal to begin with, and this has important
implications towards the way that the courts function.
On a personal level, officials’ viewpoints were in part representative of a personality type
with strong convictions about right and wrong. To enter the field of law enforcement, or
prosecution, a person must believe wholeheartedly in their work, replacing any doubts about bias
with belief in their morals. In other words, they justify complex social issues on a personal level,
using their own lack of wrongdoing as evidence of the system’s functioning. This was a trend
that I observed throughout my fieldwork. There were important discrepancies between the
perceptions of ordinary people and those of the officials. It was common for officials to have a
much smaller point of view in evaluating the system.
Generally, the courts seemed to be biased in favor of white people, as each and every
official that I met with or observed was white. Furthermore, the ability to speak in the formal
manner that the courtroom expected was a crucial divider between people who were able to
shape proceedings and those who were shaped by them. This legalese was nearly unrecognizable
with common English. When I began my fieldwork, I was forced to familiarize myself rapidly
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with this same way of speaking. By and large, most defendants were forced to watch as their
lawyers represented them, unable to participate in it. Finally, physical barriers shaped the
experiences of defendants when at the courthouse, as people were expected to follow a specific
set of instructions when entering and exiting, through areas controlled by courtroom workers.
Thus, ordinary people who were forced to go to the courthouse were also forced to conduct
themselves in a certain manner and had their time already planned when they arrived.
Interviews proved to be my most valuable source of information during my fieldwork. I
gained access to some of the most influential people at the courthouse, and was able to glean
much from the experience that they had working. Most notably, I conducted interviews with
Allison Carmichael, the Chief Public Defender, Perry Grayson, the District Attorney, Jimmy
Molaskey, the Court Administrator, and Richard James, the Chief Sheriff’s Deputy. I will
introduce each of them briefly, as their work and their backgrounds are very important to my
fieldwork. My most meaningful insights arose from Carmichael, who was more aware of the
shortcomings of the justice system, and the difficulties of her job. I intended to meet with her for
around a half hour or so, but our conversation swelled to an hour. Her main responsibility was
gathering information on cases, and making plea arrangements with her clients, but, when
necessary, also spent time in court. She was the only person I interviewed who discussed race
and demographics with me. In her eyes, the main flaw of the justice system was its inability to
move people who did not deserve to be in jail for mental purposes, out. Every other person was
reluctant to reveal insights they undoubtedly had from working in the field.
Meanwhile, Perry Grayson, the District Attorney, took a hardline approach to crime and
what should be done about it. He had always wanted to be either a police officer or a prosecutor.
Thus, he felt very passionately about his work at the courthouse. Although he insisted that if his
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office makes a case, they are convinced they have the right person, Grayson acknowledged that
at times they may jail people who did not deserve it but solely because, in his words, “there’s
nowhere else to put them.” He confided to me that he resented some of the tactics the defense
case often uses, such as intimidation of victims.
Richard James, the Chief Sheriff’s Deputy, worked in law enforcement for around 40
years. We talked for around an hour and a half, despite being promised only a half hour or so.
Chief James viewed the Black Lives Matter movement as vilifying the entire police force
because of a few “bad apples,” and was the best example of someone who had difficulty
separating their home from their work life, having spent such a long time in similar positions.
This is important because it is indicative of how invested in their work many officials are. This
investment, coupled with a devout sense of right and wrong, was common for courtroom
workers. Although serving as justification for choice of employment, these attitudes made it
difficult for many to acknowledge flaws in the justice system or outside influences. For some,
their jobs were tied to who they are, thus making it impossible to critique the system without also
critiquing the person.
Finally, Jimmy Molaskey, the Court Administrator, played a less hands on role on
proceedings than did the other interviewees, but informed me about basic court practices, and the
guiding principles on which the bureaucracy runs. Importantly, these included acting impartially
and fairly towards all parties, which was one of the main characteristics that the courts attempted
to embody. Previously, the way the courts were to be run was left undefined, but after the
implementation of the guiding principles, implemented by Molaskey, this changed. Molaskey
was the first interview that I conducted, and his responses about an ‘ideal’ prosecutor and
defense attorney were immensely helpful for the remainder of my fieldwork and for future
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interviews.
Important Literature in the Field
The fields of sociology and legal anthropology examine some of my core questions, and
serve as the backbone for my analysis. Using participant observation as a way of gleaning
answers that may shed light on the courts, a variety of authors have written about power, race,
gender, and language as they relate to the court system. Despite the differences between
individual locations, when taken together they allow for trends to be observed in communities.
Bourdieu (1987:841), for example, writes that “[t]he juridical field is the basis of the supply of
legal services arising from professional competition; demand is always partially conditioned by
the effect of this supply. There is constant tension between the available juridical norms, which
appear universal, and the necessarily diverse social demand.” Carol Greenhouse, David Engel,
William O’Barr, Alice Goffman, and Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, among others, make up
an important part of the subfield that analyzes this tension and that came to fruition during the
death of Ezell Ford.
Ewick and Silbey (1998:43) write that “[l]egality is a structural component of society.
That is, legality consists of cultural schemas and resources that operate to define and pattern
social life. At the same time that schemas and resources shape social relations, they must also be
continually produced and worked on by individual and group actors.” Exploring how intertwined
the law is in defining social relations, Ewick and Silbey insist that the concept of ‘legality’ is
intrinsically linked to the makeup of their community. By the same token, illegality shares a
similar link with the communities that define it, determining social attitudes towards various
actions. Only afterwards are these actions judged to have been acceptable (legal) or not (illegal).
This act of judging is key. Many of the people I spoke with during my fieldwork were adamant
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that the law acts as an impartial body, separate from outside influences that could affect the
outcome of a legal dispute. To Ewick and Silbey, however, the law does not exist in its own
sphere, but rather is intimately linked to other sections of life.
In Praying for Justice, Greenhouse (1986:198) argues that the residents of a southern
town named ‘Hopewell,’ use their religious faith to “sustain” social ties, and thus, the law. In
“framing a desire for freedom – which is not freedom, believers articulate relationships, the idea
of whose rewards they cherish. In the desire for freedom, more than in freedom, individuals
simultaneously evoke their mutual separateness and their bonds.” Meanwhile, “[i]n their
confirmed desire for freedom, the hypothesis that social life can be understood in terms of
personal meaning is both confirmed and clarified.” This is important because it ties religion to
social life. Meanwhile, social life, as Greenhouse (1994:175) alludes to, is intimately tied to the
law. In Law and Community in Three American Towns, she found that people from three
different regions of the United States held similar views about the law – namely that they looked
down upon people who had breached it, and also appreciated how local laws reflected the values
of their specific way of life (Greenhouse 1994:44).
Alice Goffman (2014:122), in her book On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City,
conducted sociological fieldwork in Philadelphia, analyzes the ways that African-American men
must navigate the criminal justice system. She found that their lives can center around the
threat—or reality—of prisons, which can affect them, their family, and their friends (Goffman
2014:183). In other words, these are effects of the biases that govern police or lawyers’
judgments. She goes on to explain that the penal system is so internalized by African-American
youths that it “furnishes the social events around which young people work out their
relationships to one another.” Although “contact with the criminal justice system is almost
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universally understood as something to be avoided,” certain people or communities can be forced
to negotiate a more challenging relationship with it.
William O’Barr, in his fascinating book Linguistic Evidence: Language, Power, and
Strategy in the Courthouse, describes how language specifically is manipulated by lawyers and
judges as a way of creating boundaries between them and common people. There are also
different tactics for speaking to men and women. He writes, “the legal system contains another
set of assumptions about language and communication [that] are implicit in the regularities of
courtroom procedures and may be discovered through detailed observation of courts in action”
(O’Barr 1984:39). His point is that, because of the gravity of the situation, languages biases are
used as a weapon to tip the scale slightly in one direction or another, but normally at the expense
of ordinary citizens.
A number of other authors have contributed important articles to the field that are
relevant to my work. Pierre Bourdieu, for example, in “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology
of the Juridical Field,” examines the way that power is manifested in the courtroom, dividing its
participants into those with influence and those without it. He explains that “[t]here is no doubt
that the practice of those responsible for ‘producing’ or applying the law owes a great deal to the
similarities which link the holders of this quintessential form of symbolic power to the holders of
worldly power in general” (Bourdieu 1987:842). He explores this intersection of legal authority
and social, political, and economic influence.
In addition, Bryna Bogoch, in “Courtroom Discourse and the Gendered Construction of
Professional Identity” (1999), writes about a sense of professional identity is maintained,
specifically focusing on women. Analyzing court proceedings in Israel, she uses quantitative
analysis to show how “the professional competence of women lawyers was challenged and
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undermined” (Bogoch 1999:329). Sigurd D’hondt, in “The Cultural Defense as Courtroom
Drama: The Enactment of Identity, Sameness, and Difference in Criminal Trial Discourse”
(2010), examines how courtroom proceedings are a battle between ways of life, and a convenient
way for one set of views to dominate others. Using an example of a Turkish man accused of
battery in Belgium, she writes on how the discourse of “Cultural Otherness” shapes proceedings
between competing ways of life (D’hondt 2010:67). Next, Brian Johnson, in his piece “The
Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: Integrating Judge- and County-Level Influences,”
makes a similar argument, but focuses on the sentencing process itself, and the ways that it is
shaped by outside influence.
Furthermore, James Ptacek, in Battered Women in the Courtroom: The Power of Judicial
Responses (1999), argues that the demeanor in responding to lawyers or defendants, specifically
when responding to females, is important in maintaining their image. The way that they present
themselves is crucial for judges. Nigel Fielding (2013) has also written an interesting article on
the experiences that common people have while in court in the United Kingdom, serving as a
defendant. Finally, Phoebe Ellsworth and Samuel Sommers explain in “Race in the Courtroom:
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions” (2000), racial bias can be difficult to
acknowledge due to the emotional response it produces. Guilt or shame at this bias often leads to
its stiffening, which does not solve the problem as it continues to affect people implicitly
(Ellsworth and Sommers 2000:1372). This is an important factor in explaining how proceedings
go once inside the courthouse.
Power in the Courthouse
There is a pyramid of power that defines the way interactions are supposed to go while in
the courtroom. It overlaps with gender and race, but also includes other norms I observed and
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that make it convenient to separate the officials from common people. At the top of this pyramid
of major players is the judge, whose permission must be sought even with tasks so basic as
approaching the bench. He dictates notes to the clerks and decides on sentencing. Next, the
lawyers also enjoy positions of power within the court system, with their role varying according
to their job description. Defense lawyers act as interpreters between the law and their clients,
who can have difficulty understanding how to navigate the bureaucracy and make sense of
proceedings. Despite their association with the accused, the defense ultimately also depends on
the law for their job. They are decidedly more on the side of common people, but there is a limit
to how much they can help them. Thus, the law is tied to social relations. And these relations
become evident even in the physical layout of the building.
Immediately after entering the courthouse, there is a security station that screens who can
enter or not, and what they are allowed to bring. Despite being friendly with the security guards,
and visiting at least twice a week, each time I was expected to take my laptop out of my
backpack and turn it on. I was made to do the same with my phone. A small fence separated
those entering from those exiting, assuring that all visitors had to pass security before they were
allowed access to the building. Visitors had no control over this, but rather were expected to
abide by these rules even when they were often forced to be there against their will. When in the
courthouse, visitors are all treated with suspicion. It embodies the same ‘otherness’ that was
prominent in Ford’s death.
Within the courtroom, there are definite boundaries between those who are allowed to
participate and those who, if allowed to enter, can only observe. After reaching the top floor
where the main courtrooms are, for example, every person must check in with the attendants that
guard the doors. These women serve as gatekeepers, admitting and denying people as they see
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fit. beforehand, to the point that defendants have no say in what is to happen to them. Once
inside, other barriers exist. Bourdieu (1987:828), for example, analyzes the space that courtroom
actors perform in, noting that the “judicial space…divides those qualified to participate in the
game and those who, though they may find themselves in the middle of it, are in fact excluded by
their inability to accomplish the conversion of mental space – and particularly of linguistic
stance.” A fence separates the seating area from the jury’s area, the judge’s desk, and the
attorney’s seats, separating people in the courtroom into those who are allowed to participate and
those who are not. Once in the sitting area, a person can only cross the threshold if they are
permitted to. In other words, a prosecutor or judge must give them explicit permission to enter
the arena before they become players in this “game.” Even those there for their own hearings
were forced to wait. Thus, the legal system exerts influence not only on defendants’ time, but
also on the space that they occupy. By obligating them to come to the courthouse, telling them
where to sit, and when to be there, the officials exert control over every aspect of their
interactions. Everything is organized.
The manner in which proceedings are run can present difficulties, as well. Fielding
(2013:297), writing about the law in the United Kingdom for example, writes how “legal
professionals recognized that certain legal conventions confused lay participants. For example,
‘the hearsay rule is baffling to witnesses.’ The effect of the doctrine of inadmissible evidence it
to exclude context, resulting in criminal history without a history.” This context is not provided
deliberately, and despite professionals’ awareness of “lay people’s” difficulties in understanding
the proceedings, nothing is done. This is because, although it was not ostensibly obvious during
my research, the situation benefits the officials. Writing specifically about how peasants make
sense of a complicated legal system, Jane Collier (1975:126) explains that “[c]ivil litigation
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between peasants helps to transfer peasant wealth to the higher classes by enriching lawyers and
judges, while the ejection of peasants who violate the strict moral code of the community serves
to maintain the precarious balance.” Still, this notion applies to anywhere there is difference in
social class. The defendants that I witnessed were “transferring wealth” by participating in
hearings, as their pay funded the upper classes.
Importantly, the goal of the prosecution is also very different from that of the defense,
symbolic of the gap between the two sides. As Court Administrator Jimmy Molaskey explained
to me, the primary purpose of these attorneys is to “get a successful prosecution” regardless of
any social implications that may underline a case. This is important because it separates the two
sides. In contrast, the defendants occupy the last portion of the pyramid, largely powerless to
influence the proceedings at all. Furthermore, vulnerability by defendants could actually be
viewed as a positive by the prosecution. As Fielding (2013:295) explains, “anxiety signaled
engagement.” The justice system’s role had been so internalized that it translated into an
emotional response. This anxiety, common to experiences for newcomers, was another way of
dividing them from the officials (Fielding 2013:298).
Power Outside of the Courthouse
As the case of Ezell Ford indicates, there is also bias that governs how the justice system
interacts with their community. This influence goes both ways; the local ethos affects what
offenses the courts are likely to prosecute more strongly, while breaking the law reinforces the
idea that some action is wrong. As Greenhouse writes, concerning Hopewell, “litigation – the
invocation of state legal authority – is a sign of difference and anticommunitarianism, but
difference is also a justification of litigation by ‘insiders’ in defense of their community”
(Greenhouse 1994:175). Just as I found during my participant observation, and which many of
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my participants declined to acknowledge, the law can be influenced by a variety of factors. It is
not independent of outside influence, but rather involved in a complicated exchange of ideas
within the context of a place. Johnson writes that his “study demonstrates that the criminal
sentencing decision-making process is jointly influenced by individual case characteristics,
judicial background factors, and county-level contextual influences” (Johnson 2006:291). These
are some of the same influences that Greenhouse alluded to. As Allison Carmichael explained to
me, the context of Silver County is shaped by its ruralness and conservativeness, so these two
factors help to shape the identity of courtroom officials even if they do not acknowledge it.
Judges, in particular, are powerful people with biases that can influence their views. D’hondt
(2010:92) elaborates, “the interactional effect of this reconfiguration of identities is that the
courtroom setting now appears to be ironically embodying ‘we’-ness together with normality. In
this way, the hegemonic position of ‘our’ culture as the invisible epicenter of normality can be
maintained in an entirely inconspicuous fashion.”
In looking at the way these judges manage “cultural property,” Tim Murphy (2004:126)
explains that “the policy objective is to transform senior judges into managers and to make it
their explicit responsibility to manage in bulk the process of decision-making against the
background of performance targets and outcomes.” This refers to the intended standardization of
the judges’ work, which can be simplified slightly by checking a defendant’s actions against
what they know about an area’s value set. Still, implementing it is more difficult, and I saw
much variation between individual judges and their styles. Johnson (2006:283), for example,
found that “the effect of the judge’s race was noteworthy [whereas] the influence of the judge’s
gender was minimal. The age of the judge was significant, however, with older judges being less
likely to incarcerate convicted offenders and sentencing them to shorter periods of confinement.”

Egglin 17
In my own fieldwork, although on a much smaller scale, I found that younger judges tended to
be the most impatient, while older ones tended to be more understanding. It is clear that there is
much variation between the kinds of offenses, judges, and sentences that color the way the
justice system runs. Perhaps influenced by the relatively homogenous nature of Silver County,
this was rarely mentioned to me. I saw it in practice on my own, however.
This was obvious from the simplicity in which the Chief Sheriff’s Deputy, for example,
viewed his work. His task was simply to enforce this sense of normalcy, and to remove or correct
the behavior of those who challenged it. Trish Oberweis and Michael Musheno, however, call
into question the police’s ability to accurate determine who may be a threat to breaking the law,
and the effect that such faith in their judgement has. They write, “police routinely engage in the
process of identifying who deserves a softening of the state’s coercive powers, dividing some
from others. Several ‘suspicious behaviors’ were listed as criteria” (Oberweis and Musheno
1999:907). These criteria include phrases such as “‘Wut up,’” which was included in the “criteria
of suspiciousness” (Oberweis and Musheno 1999:907). Thus, the impressions that individual
police officers had were central to people’s interactions with them, and thus to the actions that
the justice system would take. As such, it was not as objective as people would like to believe.
The entire process, rooted in experience according to James, was made according to
overly simplified criteria, and led to demographics of people appearing in court more than their
population percentage would suggest they should be. Oberweis and Musheno (1999:907)
explain, “[t]hrough this power of determination, police create a gulf between themselves and
other citizens.” Bourdieu (1987:828-829) sums up this same separation between sides, writing
that “the difference between the vulgar vision of the person who is about to come under the
jurisdiction of the court, the client, and the professional vision of the expert witness, the judge,
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the lawyer, and other juridical actors, is far from accidental.” He goes on, describing this divide,
“[r]ather, it is essential to a power relation upon which two systems of presuppositions, two
systems of expressive intention – two world views – are grounded.” As such, it is by design that
there are structural divisions between defendants the court administration. Alice Goffman
(2014:100) elaborates that the threat of prison, when citizens are confronted by police can be
used as a “tool of social control.” This is contrary to virtually everything that I was told while
conducting my fieldwork. Still, it was obvious that there were gaps between the amount of
influence different parties were allowed to have, even if it was not admitted to me very often
during my interviews.
Racial Implications in the Courtroom
Race played an important role in defining how relations at the courthouse played out. In
my own fieldwork, I found that all of the judges and lawyers were white, and that juries, a
supposedly objective third party, were also always Caucasian. Sigurd D’hondt (2010:71) sheds
some light on this in “The Cultural Defense as Courtroom Drama: The Enactment of Identity,
Sameness, and Difference in Criminal Trial Discourse,” writing that “the applicability of
particular legal doctrines crucially depends on the fact that the defendant’s otherness is tacitly
taken for granted (as an ‘object’ that exists independently of the discourse produced).” In other
words, the fact that the defendants are different from the officials is important in how the
courtroom runs, and, not only that, this notion is never up for discussion, but rather “exists
independently of the discourse produced” as a way of enacting “cultural defense” (D’hondt
2010:92) against people appearing to threaten social order. This was apparent from my fieldwork
from the amount of people who came from minority backgrounds that were present.
During our interview, Carmichael also commented to me about how the amount of people
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with a minority background in court was disproportionate to the population in Silver County.
According to her, she sees a large number of Latinos in the area, most often convicted on DUI
charges. She elaborated that, as a minority, a person has a higher chance of being stopped by
police, is likely to have a higher bail, less chance of reaching a plea agreement, and more likely
to receive a longer sentence. Silver County, in fact, has one of the highest incarceration rates in
Pennsylvania. Her explanation for why was fascinating.
Carmichael explained to me that Silver County is “very rural [and] very conservative,”
and, in light of that, its current penal system functions as the “new Jimmy Crow,” or a way to
“keep black men down.” And this is true about the United States as a whole. I asked her about
why the United States has both such a high percentage of people in prison, and a high recidivism
rate. One of the main reasons, according to her, is “institutionalized racism.” She told me a story,
where, after meeting with a white man she deemed racist, asked him, ‘Would you consider
yourself to be a racist?’ He responded: ‘No, it’s like my daddy always said, there are niggers in
every race.’ So, she continued, “at the same time that he’s denying it, he’s affirming it.” As such,
it is clear that the law is not objective; it is influenced, in this case, by people’s ideas about race.
More generally, Good (2008:S57) has written that although “empiricism may be pragmatically
justifiable in its use of the testimony of eyewitnesses to establish the chain of events leading up
to accidents…yet such an approach seems so fundamentally misguided when dealing with
‘cultural’ phenomena – which are agreed by social scientists to be contextual.” The context of
Silver County, in part, was based around these racial divides, so the impartial approach
employed by the courts was problematic.
This attitude of denying any wrongdoing, while implicitly contributing to it, creates a
climate in which the death of Ezell Ford makes sense. Although I did not witness any kind of
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racism myself during my fieldwork, it possible that I walked past or sat next to the man she was
describing to me. The power that white people hold over people of minorities, simply by being
white, is crucial. The color of their skin on its own creates a power gap that symbolically divides
them from other people, without knowing anything about who they are or where they came from.
This divide is evident in examining the kinds of people who occupy positions of power in the
courthouse. As I have said, every official that I saw was white. Although it may seem like a
coincidence, I would argue, given the skewed incarceration rates of minorities versus their
population rates, it is not. In interviewing the Chief Sherriff’s Deputy, Richard James, he was
adamant that police do not even realize that they are examining people for signs of future crimes,
it is so instinctive. In fact, it is so engrained in his psyche that, he told me, even while driving the
street while off-duty “he is scanning,” looking for signs of trouble.
To be sure, not all of the signs that James is scanning for have to do with race. But
instinctive decisions about the character of people based upon their physical appearance only
point one way. And these kinds of perceptions are indicative of the paper wall that the law
erected. Incarceration is an easy excuse to judge communities, and, if proven correct, can be
continually used as justification for having such thoughts. Doing so neglects to examine the other
factors that led to Ford’s death. For example, I would question what creates those instincts. How
do police know a specific person could be liable to committing a crime? In the case of Ezell
Ford, it had to do with race. Yet, James was very hesitant about admitting this to me. According
to him, issues simply have to do with whether or not someone is breaking the law or not. The
process is simple. People who have committed crimes already are the most likely to commit
more crimes, he told me. He was adamant that it has nothing to do with race, but rather with
keeping communities safe. But courts do not exist separately from social tension. This
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internalization and subsequent denial of racial biases is very important. If “white people are
reminded of the possibility of racial prejudice in an interaction, they may work to inhibit their
own racial biases; if they are not reminded, they might not notice, and their biases will often be
expressed” (Sommers and Ellsworth 2000:1371). In other words, white people have the luxury of
forgetting about racial bias, a notion that, when compounded with Carmichael’s analysis of her
experience and the judicial system, calls into question the impartiality of both the law and those
who interpret it.
The courts do not exist separately from the rest of the country – the tensions that divide
one divide the other. Carmichael told me that the courtroom is “ground zero” for fighting racism,
meaning it is where new attitudes are tested. As a space, the courtroom is intrinsically tied to the
social issues that the country as a whole is struggling with, meaning that, naturally, the same
issues will appear in the courthouse. Despite this, neither Chief James, nor District Attorney
Grayson, nor Court Administrator Molaskey could give me an answer about the kinds of
demographics that come through the area. When I asked him, Molaskey responded that they “get
all kinds of people.” For his part, James challenged some of the deaths, such as Ezell Ford’s
around which Black Lives Matter rallied, insisting that the issue was about the civilian’s refusal
to cooperate. This difference in perspective was very interesting. Grayson dodged the question.
This inability to acknowledge or discuss the issue of race is important. Although I could tell even
from my time that I spent in the courthouse that there were racial boundaries present, the
officials who work there seemed unwilling to perceive them. The lack of diversity among the
employees is not, in and of itself, a problem, by when one demographic is unilaterally
responsible for trying other demographics, the situation becomes more complicated. How much
power is justified? And where should it be derived from?
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On the surface, the power of the law should come from the legal system itself, but we
have already seen that the legal system is not independent of social conflict or religion, for
example. Thus, it seems that the legal system is empowered, in part, by non-legal factors. The
spectacle of the courtroom, from the judge to the jury, is designed to keep the defendant’s focus
on the present moment. However, his or her presence in the courtroom is usually not an accident.
In reality, it is the result of careful power divides that influence decision-making. As I have said,
these divides are not unilaterally dependent on the law. They also draw upon community
religious beliefs, or cultural beliefs. These factors are rarely on the side of minorities.
Part of the reason that bias is justified is the idea that people of minority backgrounds are
more prone to breaking the law. For this reason, they were often unable to climb the social
ladder. In Law and Community in Three American Towns, Greenhouse et al (1994:131) find that
“[i]f the basic struggle for upward mobility is culturally understood as the struggle to transcend
nature, then self-mastery becomes highly charged as a positive cultural value. At the top of the
hierarchy, social life can be assumed to be self-regulating…In theory, the ‘lower’ orders lack this
self-mastery.” Or, put another way, these ‘lower orders’ are “failures…[and] conflict is assumed
to flow up the social scale” (1994:131). People who commit crimes are said to have done so
because they lack the self-control that the upper classes have; they cannot control themselves
from stealing, for example. However, my own experience suggests that it is the officials who
have mastered a way of manipulating the way that the system works. Defendants do not have this
ability. In On the Run, Goffman chronicles the cycle African-Americans can become trapped in
once they have negative interactions with law enforcement. The legal system threatens them with
jail time, separation of their families, and decrease in income, factors that can force people
towards a dangerous path where they can provide better (Goffman 2014:114). Her account
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makes clear that, because they do not suffer from any of these same challenges, it is difficult for
law enforcement to empathize. The fault is shouldered by the African-Americans who have
broken the law, which allows others to feel better about their own identity.
Gender Implications in the Courtroom
Although officials would say that the proceedings are objective, there were a variety of
instances where gender bias proved significant. In my own fieldwork, I found that the number of
men far exceeded the number of women who faced trial, which Carmichael confirmed. In her
eyes, the majority of defendants she dealt with were young, white men, often with children
already. On average, about 7 out of 9 defendants were male. Thus, regardless of how officials
believed the justice system to be working, it was clear that there were important differences in
the amount of people who were being processed by the system. Women likely do not want to be
evenly represented in this statistic, but I find it significant that there was such a difference
between the two. The amount of people from each gender was not split down the middle.
Furthermore, every judge was a male, and every clerk was a female.
These clerks occupied a crucial role in courtroom hearings, yet these roles went largely
unnoticed. The clerks transcribe the judges’ official decrees, and also are responsible for
distributing paperwork and completing forms to keep the courts running smoothly. I never
witnessed any judge treat a clerk badly, but the division of power was clear. In handing
documents to the clerks, the judges, seated above them in his chair, would drop paperwork down
onto their desks that he needed to be completed, with the expectation that they would do it.
Similarly, a crucial part of the courts’ smooth operations were the attendants seated outside their
doors, who acted as gatekeepers in allowing or denying entry to people from the public. Just like
the clerks, they were always middle-aged women, and served their role away from the spotlight.
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In contrast, the judges and lawyers occupied the main space for where the legal proceedings took
place.
In addition, most juries were majority male, as well. This is important to note because
“lawyers must at one and the same time acknowledge their subordination to the judges and
convey power, authority, and credibility to the opposing sides, to their clients, and, where
necessary, to juries as well” (Bogoch 1999:331). In contrast, “judges must display dominance
and control, while appearing neutral and objective,” traits most commonly associated with men
(Bogoch 1999:333). This is not an accident. It is important to note that nothing about these
gender differences are inherently bad, but they are reflections of a system with skewed
perceptions. Despite this, many of the people I met with had difficulty acknowledging this.
In her piece, “Courtroom Discourse and the Gendered Construction of Professional
Identity,” Bryna Bogoch (1999:329) “analyzes courtroom interactions to determine how gender
affects the construction of the professional identity of lawyers and judges in Israeli district
courts.” Women such as Allison Carmichael, the Chief Public Defender “face a double bind: one
the one hand they are under pressure from their clients and the general judicial culture to adopt
an aggressive, adversarial interactional style in the courtroom; on the other hand, if they do so,
they incur disapprobation for behaving in a manner unbecoming a woman” (Bogoch 1999:332).
Carmichael herself acknowledged gender expectations that accompanied her role in the
courtroom. According to her, she is forced to occupy a variety of roles, including “social
worker, minister, and mother,” to her clients, a distinctive feature that could only come with
being a woman.
To be sure, she discussed the need to also be a “mechanic” or “a plumber,” but the gender
implications are clear. Carmichael’s identity in the courtroom was shaped by her being a woman.
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She was expected to nurture her clients, many of whom were “young enough to be her kids,”
while also serving as an interpreter of the law for them. As Bogoch (1999:332) writes, “women
who have achieved top managerial or professional status often feel they are expected to adopt
male interactional styles in the workplace in order to assert their authority.” Possibly because
each of the judges were male, and the juries consisted largely of males, it was common for
female attorneys to behave in what would be considered male behavior It is paradoxical for a
female defense attorney to be a mother and a fierce advocate for their client, yet that is the role
that female officials were expected to play.
In addition, gender bias was also evident in how the court addressed its attorneys.
Whereas males were referenced more formally, females were often represented by their marital
status. For example, Bogoch (1999:344) writes that male lawyers could be called “Attorney
Cohen,” while female ones might be addressed as “Ms. Cohen.” Male attorneys were also
chastised mainly for being overly aggressive (Bogoch 1999:362), indicating that many felt
compelled to adhere to gender stereotypes about asserting dominance while in the courtroom. In
other words, gender norms played a role in dictating how courtroom workers viewed themselves
and their work. While I myself did not witness any attorneys of either gender being overly
aggressive, I noticed distinct styles between the male and female lawyers. The males tended to
stand closer to the jury when speaking to them, while the females often stood further away,
sometimes behind a podium. I never witnessed a female attorney interrupt a male one with an
objection, but I witnessed the opposite, and a male lawyer interrupting another, multiple times.
Bogoch offers an explanation for this phenomenon, which is in line with her own
findings. She writes, “in discussions of gender and interruptions, it has been generally been
found that women are less likely to interrupt men, mainly because of the power difference
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between the two” (Bogoch 1999:346). Despite her assertion that “lawyers often interrupt other
lawyers and witnesses in order to channel the testimony in the direction they seek, or to prevent
the other side from challenging their own version of reality,” in my experience it was only
women who were interrupted by men. Thus, not all lawyers are prone to challenging the other
side’s version of events, but rather it is usually men objecting to each other, or to women, in
accordance with gender norms. In my own fieldwork, only when reassured by these norms did
attorneys tend to object.
Interestingly, many of the prosecutors that I witnessed during my participant observation
were women. Within the department, two of the five attorneys are female. While not a large
enough sample size to be statistically significant, it was important for my fieldwork. Possibly as
a result of the times in which I was able to attend hearings, females normally represented the
commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the proceedings. There were implications of this. I would
often enter courtrooms before they began to listen to the officials chat amongst themselves
between hearings, and when referencing their female colleagues, it was common to discuss their
marital status; on one occasion, I heard one person mention that a female colleague had “robbed
a cradle,” meaning her husband was young. In all the time I spent observing the courtroom
workers, I never heard them reference the marital status of a male.
Thus, there are dominant currents that underline the judicial system, including gender.
Although it strives to be impartial, the justice system is not immune to implicit biases, either.
Generally, as O’Barr explains, there are guidelines for how female witnesses should be treated.
They include being “especially courteous to women,” avoiding “making them cry,” and using the
difference in women’s behavior “to advantage” (O’Barr 1984:63). Given that “[w]omen are
contrary witnesses. They hate to say yes…A woman’s desire to avoid the obvious answer will
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lead her right into your real objective – contradicting the testimony of previous
witnesses…Women, like children, are prone to exaggeration; they generally have poor
memories” (Bailey and Rothblatt 1973 qtd. in O’Barr 1984:63). The presence of such attitudes
within the legal community is telling of how biases continue to exist, even if they are not
outwardly discussed. To be sure, the piece O’Barr quotes was written in 1973, but it firmly
places the role of women below that of men while in the courthouse. In fact, it is a technique of
male lawyers to influence proceedings, specifically targeting women. I did not get a chance to
study this during my own research, but within my own limited sample size, I did find make note
of males’ more aggressive speaking style while speaking.
There were also differences between how the judges treated female defendants and male
defendants. During my fieldwork, it was much more common for judges to lash out at male
defendants at a perceived waste of the court’s time. On three separate occasions, I witnessed the
same judge raise his voice at men, for their inability to pay someone, or violating their parole.
Tellingly, he never did the same to women. Although it is possible that this is just a coincidence,
and a result of the judge’s exposure to those three particularly noncooperative men, I would
argue that, if “judicial demeanor is best understood as the emotional presentation of authority by
judges” as Ptacek (1999:95) argues, this is implicit, but rather an explicit attempt by the judge to
appear fair and compassionate. Ptacek (1999:95) continues, “the emphasis on authority derives
from the fact that in the courtroom judges are always ‘doing authority,’ even when smiling or
joking with other court officers. The weight of their institutionalized power imbalances every
interaction.” Thus, the demeanor of the judges that I witnessed could be interpreted as a way of
trying to mitigate this imbalance of power. Still, given that “[h]ow judges speak, the kinds of
questions they ask, their facial expressions, how close to the bench they allow women to stand,
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how diligent they are at assisting women – all of these behaviors symbolically express an image
of authority in the person of the judge” (Ptacek 1999:95), it is a shallow attempt by the ultimate
authority in the courtroom at disguising the power that they have.
The attempt at hiding divisions of power is dangerous, as it makes it more difficult to
ascertain where one’s authority begins and ends. Still, as I found, an analysis of discourse reveals
a variety of important information that underlines the relationships. Bourdieu, for example,
examines these power relations more generally. He writes “[t]he history of social welfare law
clearly demonstrates that the body of law constantly registers a state of power relations. It thus
legitimizes victories over the dominated, which are thereby converted into accepted facts”
(Bourdieu 1987:817). Thus, given that it was evoked by someone in a position of power, this
subtle difference in treatment becomes an “accepted fact.” Applied to gender bias, and to
personal experience within the courtroom, the fact that it was a judge excused him of any
accusation of bias towards females, excusing his actions from discussion.
Yet, simply by treating women kindly, the judge made sure that others would follow him.
As Bourdieu (1987:842) explains, “[t]here is no doubt that the practice of those responsible for
‘producing’ or applying the law owes a great deal to the similarities which link the holders of
this quintessential form of symbolic power to the holders of worldly power in general, whether
political or economic.” Put another way, this symbolic power, which judges hold over people’s
heads and create gaps even with acts so insignificant as gossiping or greeting them, is crucial in
illustrating the difficulties that women face. By and large, however, the officials were unable or
unwilling to acknowledge this. If they could, the judges would view everyone exactly the same,
gossip about the same things, and address them in the same manner. But at the Silver Country
Courthouse, this is not the case.
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Language Differences
Furthermore, the way that language is conducted within the courtroom is also endowed
with cultural capital that defendants are noticeably lacking. The proceedings can only function in
this manner, without any way for defendants to counter it. As D’hondt (2010:92) explains,
separation between defendants and officials “is only possible because these techniques for
ironically projecting ‘we’ and ‘they’ onto the developing speech situation do not challenge the
formats of participation that are bureaucratically imposed by the protocol.” In fact, “they draw
upon and reinforce them; invoking an expert identity or providing information about preparatory
meetings accentuates rather than suppresses the attorney’s involvement in the inquisitorial part of
the criminal procedure.” Language is a way of clearly dividing “we” from “they,” as it allows
one group to run the proceedings in the courtroom. This formal language is known as ‘legalese,’
and it renders one group of people powerless.
For example, the way that lawyers speak to their clients, and to their opposition’s clients,
is carefully manipulated to evoke desired responses. O’Barr (1984:18) explains that “legal
language is extraordinarily wordy…lacks clarity…is pompous…and [is] simply dull.” O’Barr
(1984:32) also notes that attorneys make “effective use of variations in question format to get the
most favorable responses for [their] client[s],” which allows them to “maintain tight control over
witnesses during cross-examination.” Thus, language is used as a way of delicately pushing
defendants, who may not know exactly what they are being manipulated into doing, towards
acting in the way that the attorneys want. I asked Molaskey about this, and he responded that,
after meeting with their lawyers, it is expected that the clients understand exactly what is going
on. Yet, even by the end of my few months of conducting fieldwork, I still heard words whose
meaning I did not know. As I have said, I also had to look up legal vocabulary after starting my
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fieldwork, as I found it difficult to keep up with the formal language. This distinction is largely
unnecessary, yet, despite this, none of the officials I spoke with thought that this difference in
language was a problem – after meeting with their attorneys it was expected for everyone to be
on the same page. This language is foster such separation.
Analyzing the “practices and processes” of courts in Antigua, Mindie Lazarus-Black
(1995:637) has written how courts are set up around “creating an environment in which certain
languages, speech styles, individuals, social groups, or forms of behavior are ‘automatically,’
‘naturally,’ and ‘hegemonically’ positioned as subordinate.” Legalese, in a way, is an entirely
different language from normal conversational speak. This difference serves as a manner of
“humiliation” (Lazarus-Black 1995:637). That is why, during my own fieldwork, most
defendants sat passively while their attorneys attempted to advocate on their behalf. In addition,
the terms that are used within the courthouse serve as a way to separate people from the
courtroom authorities. As Lazarus-Black (1995:637) explains, “magistrates become ‘Your
Honor,’ lawyers are ‘learned friends’ police are ‘public servants,’ and probation officers are
‘knowledgeable experts.’ Such titles perpetuate the hierarchical relationships between the agents
of the state and ordinary citizens, who bring their grievances to court.” This practice of
“euphemism” is detrimental. I frequently took note of how judges were addressed as ‘Your
Honor,’ in my own notes, despite having been chatting with the same people who addressed
them formally minutes before. It seemed ironic to me that this was necessary.
The difficulties that can arise from working in the courtroom are augmented when a
defendant is unable to speak English at all. At least once a week a translator was required,
usually for Spanish, to interpret the proceedings. Being reliant on another person, especially
when their livelihood was at stake, must have been a difficult experience. On one occasion, I
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witnessed a Latino man attempt to speak English and represent himself, only to be told by the
judge to stop and speak through his interpreter. In other words, the fact that the proceedings take
place in English, because that is the language of all the judges and jury members, complicates the
hearings for people that may not speak English natively. Furthermore, countrywide, “[w]ho pays,
adequacy, checks on the quality, form of interpretation, and who interprets are still subject to
much variation within the American legal system” (O’Barr 1984:39).
To be sure, the court does not ignore those people, it helps them, but in doing so they are
forced to start from a lower point than are the rest of the population. It is clear it is not the courts’
first priority, and this attitude has effects on individual people and their views towards the legal
system. In contrast, those people can worry about their sentence or plea, while others must focus
on whether or not they will be able to understand what will happen. On a personal level, I
witnessed 5 or 6 defendants during my time working, and it was common for the defendant to
appear more downbeat or reserved than the majority of other people. I would imagine that, in
part, some of the challenges they experienced in court were related to this language barrier,
which was designed to keep one group of people more powerful than any others.
Conclusion
My research focused on the discrepancy between how the courts ran, and how the
officials believed that they ran. Ultimately, it is clear that working as a public servant is a
difficult job, and that the demands of the position affect the people that occupy them. Carol
Greenhouse (1994:131), for example, elaborates further on this and how attitudes towards law
enforcement specifically can impact the way a court functions. The positions are high-pressure
and demanding, more so because attitudes towards the law depend on the context in which the
community is based. Court officials, therefore, must be able to read and react to these attitudes
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and make decisions with them. Interestingly, however, the officials I met with had a difficult
time admitting this, instead insisting that the system functioned impartially. Given the way that
citizens view the law, it is no wonder that the law enforcement themselves share their opinions.
However, it is surprising that they struggle to admit this.
Only the Chief Public Defender, Allison Carmichael, had a candid discussion with me
about the justice system’s inability to influence all demographics equally. In contrast, many of
the other bureaucrats that I spoke with, especially those involved with the prosecution or
sheriff’s department, saw their work through a binary of right and wrong. They expected that
everyone shared these views. In other words, their task was simple: to enforce the law. If
someone breaking the law, they had to be apprehended. The hearings, therefore, also had an
explicit purpose: to bring justice to people who had broken it. Silver County District Attorney
Perry Grayson mentioned to me in our interview that his office is confident that they always
apprehend the right person. If they are not certain, they do not file charges. In their eyes, the
judicial process seemed so simple: law enforcement arrests a person, against whom the DA’s
office either chooses to bring charges or not. The only relevant information is if the accused
broke the law or not, and if there is evidence to support their claim. Nothing else matters. Put
another way, to them the law acted equally upon people, regardless of ethnicity, language skills,
or skin color.
However, tension comes to a head in the courtroom, where attitudes no longer have any
place to hide, and the walls that divide communities become clear. Whether for this reason or
not, the lack of control that ordinary people have while in the courtroom is both striking and
crucial to their experiences with the legal system. For this reason, people of a minority
background are especially helpless, as they do not participate in the process of legality defining
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the mainstream is afforded. This is a serious hurdle that minorities must face during their time in
court. Had Ezell Ford been given the chance to appear in court, he would have been subject to
biases that had to do with his skin color, ability to articulate himself, and his neighborhood or
origin, just as he had to when dealing with the police. The reasons for the police apprehending
him, despite a lack of incriminating evidence, are rich with anthropological and sociologically
relevant motives that can tell much about the biases that shape perceptions.
It is obvious that the context in which Silver County is situated played a role in
determining how the proceedings went. Carmichael described the area as “rural,” and
“conservative,” and pointed out to me that the rate at which minorities are arrested exceeds the
rate at which they populate the area. In her words, the reasons for this was “institutionalized
racism,” or the idea that the justice system implicitly attempts to “hold black men down.” James
did not explicitly share this same attitude, as evidenced by his discussion of instinct while
working in law enforcement, the same instinct that brought the death of Ezell Ford. Still, he,
Grayson, and Molaskey all had difficulty having a frank discussion about the demographics that
are often found in the courtroom as defendants. This is especially surprising given the number of
ways in which the legal system erects a paper wall to separate those within it from those outside.
For instance, the way that people were expected to speak while in court separated those
who could switch into a much more formal dialect, and those who could not. The people I spoke
with that worked at the courthouse saw themselves as being fluent in the formal speak, legalese,
that is necessary for proceedings, while it was clear during my observation that the defendants
were not. Still, it was the expectation of the officials that, after having met with their lawyer once
or twice, they would be. William O’Barr (1984:18) shed light on this issue, explaining how
“legal language is pompous [and] simply dull” And this is just one example of the structure built-
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in to the way the courts run that make them less impartial. For people who did not speak English,
their experience was even more complicated. They were reliant on their translator to relay the
events to them, at the mercy of attorneys, judge, and jury who did not even speak their language.
They were truly alone, and not for any fault of their own. Grayson and others’ position of power
at the courthouse shaped the lens through which they interpreted their surroundings. This point
of view was complicated by the luxuries that many officials at the Silver County Courthouse
enjoyed but did not include in their assessment that the justice system was objective.
In addition, there was also implicit bias in how women were treated in the courtroom,
given that the dominant identity there was male. The context in which it was fostered favored
males, as indicated in the ways that female attorneys could be addressed and the way judges
were expected to behave (Bogoch 1999:333-346). While judges were expected to always
“display dominance and control,” stereotypically male characteristics, females could be stripped
of their law degree in being addressed as “Ms” or “Mrs.” These barriers served as a way of
empowering the dominant context in which the courts are situated, which favored men over
women and white people over minorities. To reinforce the boundaries that they created, there are
other boundaries. There are physical boundaries within the courthouse, dictating where visitors
are allowed to go, and demanding that they submit to security before entering. From the moment
they enter the courthouse, defendants lack control. Furthermore, the biases that are present in
police allow them to make judgments that influence who is arrested, which can be used as
evidence of their correctness. It creates a cycle that endorses a legal methodology that does little
to better the lives of people who are struggling. In light of this, it is no wonder that the Black
Lives Matter movement has risen, and that the deaths of people such as Ezell Ford, helpless to
resist both inside and outside the courthouse on their own, have inflamed whole communities to
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do so on their behalf.
Officials can become so committed to their work that they had a difficult time separating
it from their personal lives, causing this significant discrepancy. Grayson, the Chief Sheriff’s
Deputy Richard James, and court administrator Jimmy Molaskey all mentioned this to me. They
were so personally invested in what they were doing that they had a difficult time acknowledging
some of the flaws in the system. The ‘instincts’ that accompanied law enforcement jobs were
also a tool for associating communities with negative ideas. On the other hand, the Chief Public
Defender, Allison Carmichael, saw the system’s disproportionate incarceration of minorities as a
huge problem. The difference in perspective is striking, despite that all four work in the same
building. Carmichael was decidedly more on the side of the defendants. In essence, there were
inhibiting factors for people foreign to the legal system, yet the officials were so used to them
that they did not take them into account. This lack of reflexivity was specific to the prosecution.
In part, this is because the defender’s office gets to know its clients much better than the
prosecutor’s office does, who is acting on a file they have compiled, or a name. This distinction
sums up the relationship between the two sides that are so crucial to the justice system.
Interestingly, despite this acknowledgement, by and large the officials at the courthouse would
not or could not see flaws in the justice system, as it was intrinsically tied to their sense of
personal and local worth. Officials gave into artificial coloring of the law based on their local
context, and internalized it to the point that they believed wholeheartedly in it. Their belief was
so absolute that they did not view it as subjective, instead arguing that the law was an objective
judge of community character. They seem to deny that law has links with any other aspect of
life. This problem then reproduced itself, creating a cycle of division that has come to a head
recently and will continue to do so until important social changes are made.
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